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Becoming aware of errors that one has committed might be crucial for strategic
behavioral and neuronal adjustments to avoid similar errors in the future. This review
addresses conscious error perception (“error awareness”) in healthy subjects as well
as the relationship between error awareness and neurological and psychiatric diseases.
We first discuss the main findings on error awareness in healthy subjects. A brain
region, that appears consistently involved in error awareness processes, is the insula,
which also provides a link to the clinical conditions reviewed here. Then we focus on
a neurological condition whose core element is an impaired awareness for neurological
consequences of a disease: anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). The insular cortex has
been implicated in both error awareness and AHP, with anterior insular regions being
involved in conscious error processing and more posterior areas being related to AHP. In
addition to cytoarchitectonic and connectivity data, this reflects a functional and structural
gradient within the insula from anterior to posterior. Furthermore, studies dealing with
error awareness and lack of insight in a number of psychiatric diseases are reported.
Especially in schizophrenia, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, (ADHD) and autism
spectrum disorders (ASD) the performance monitoring system seems impaired, thus
conscious error perception might be altered.
Keywords: insula, error awareness, anosognosia, lack of insight, conscious error perception, error-related
negativity (ERN), error positivity (Pe)
INTRODUCTION
For daily life it is important that we become aware of the conse-
quences of our actions, of failures and limitations that force us to
change our behavior and strategies. In clinical settings, reduced
conscious perception of errors has been associated with poor
insight in consequences of neurological conditions (O’Keeffe
et al., 2004). Whereas it is still unclear whether conscious per-
ception of errors is a necessary prerequisite for all kinds of
post-error adjustment (cf. Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011),
in situations when several people work together it certainly is,
because only after conscious detection and appreciation of an
error it can be communicated to others and appropriate mea-
sures can be taken. This review deals with brain areas that have
been shown to play a role in conscious error detection (or “error
awareness”) in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or
patient studies. Additionally, electrophysiological studies address-
ing error awareness and their functional and clinical relevance will
be discussed.
Relevant brain areas in the context of error awareness are
the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC), the thalamus and,
as we want to argue in the course of this review, most impor-
tant, the anterior insula. The insula seems to be crucial for
error awareness, because fMRI studies revealed that the insula is
consistently activated for consciously perceived errors compared
to unperceived errors (Klein et al., 2007a; Hester et al., 2009).
Recently, the insula has been suggested to be of relevance for
interoception (Craig, 2009, 2011). On the one hand, interocep-
tion might contribute to conscious error detection processes,
because errors elicit a number of autonomic responses, e.g.,
changes in heart rate (Wessel et al., 2011) and skin conduc-
tance responses (O’Connell et al., 2007), that could potentially
be detected by the (anterior) insula. On the other hand, lesions in
more posterior regions of the insula have been associated with
anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP, Karnath et al., 2005). AHP
describes the unawareness of motor deficits that are related to
hemiplegia. Vocat and Vuilleumier (2010) proposed that anosog-
nosia is a multi-componential disorder affecting bodily awareness
(amongst other things), or in other words, affecting interocep-
tion. Thus, both error awareness and AHP might be linked
through interoception or the proper integration of interocep-
tion and exteroception. The potential relationship between error
awareness and AHP has already been discussed by Vocat and
Vuilleumier (2010). Since error awareness processes have been
located in the inferior anterior part of the insula, and AHP can
be observed after lesions in more posterior parts of the insula, we
propose that there is a functional gradient in the insula from ante-
rior to posterior that reflects different aspects of interoception.
A similar gradient has also been observed in cytoarchitectonics
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and structural as well as functional connectivity analyses of the
insular cortex. In this review we want to argue that the insular
cortex, due to its cytoarchitectonic layout and its functional as
well as structural connectivity, is perfectly suited to play a key
role in error awareness. The processing of interoceptive infor-
mation might deliver information that supports error awareness.
The recently proposed role of the insula as a relay station regu-
lating interactions between brain networks involved in external
attention and interoceptive cognition (Menon and Uddin, 2010)
fits well with the proposed role of the insula in error aware-
ness. Interoceptive information supports error awareness, which
in turn might lead to an orienting reaction to the now salient
external event.
In the following, we will start with a brief overview over the
research on error awareness and its electrophysiological corre-
lates. Then, we will report the neuroanatomical and neurochem-
ical basis of error awareness, with a special focus on the insular
cortex. The insular focus and the concept of interoception will
lead to a brief discussion on AHP. To complete the picture on
error awareness, we selectively report findings on those psychi-
atric disorders where (a) structural or functional changes in the
insula have been reported (among other changes in various brain
areas), and (b) electrophysiological studies on error processing
exist that suggest an impairment in error awareness.
Error awareness describes the ability to consciously perceive
one’s own mistakes. A mistake is the failure to achieve the
intended goal of an action. Current views suggest that error
awareness can be explained by an accumulating evidence account
(Ullsperger et al., 2010; Vocat and Vuilleumier, 2010; Wessel
et al., 2011; Wessel, 2012). This account describes the accumu-
lation of evidence for an error from very different sources, e.g.,
pMFC activity, proprioceptive and other sensory input that devi-
ates from expectation, and/or changes in the autonomic nervous
system. Thus, each event is evaluated as to whether it indicates
or predicts an action outcome that is different (worse) than
intended. For example, a deviation of the motor efference copy
and/or the proprioceptive and sensory feedback from predictions
made in forward models of the action (Desmurget and Grafton,
2000) can indicate that the entire action is going to fail. Later,
the observation of the outcome itself deviating from the goal pro-
vides additional evidence for the mistake. Moreover, when two
alternative response tendencies compete, the resulting response
conflict has been suggested to provide evidence for the error
(Yeung et al., 2004). These pieces of evidence, which by them-
selves can be expressed as deviations from predictions (prediction
errors), accumulate during and after the action. Evidence accu-
mulation can start as early as the action is initiated, but the point
of awareness can be temporally detached from the actual error
(e.g., in underdetermined responding, error awareness can only
occur after external feedback). Vocat and Vuilleumier (2010) sug-
gest a comparable mechanism, for explicit awareness of motor
impairments, i.e., the integration of information from different
channels.
It should be noted that the evidence accumulation account
outlined above is compatible with predictive coding accounts of
awareness and motor action control (e.g., Friston et al., 2010;
Seth et al., 2011). Whether error awareness itself is a product
of another higher-level predictive-coding mechanism that, for
example, compares the predicted task performance with the accu-
mulating prediction error evidence remains to be investigated.
Reduced error awareness can occur under normal as well
as pathological conditions. One major determinant may be the
type of error that is committed. Depending on the complexity
of the task, the level of processing and the information avail-
able, different error types can be detected with different reliability
(Reason, 1990). During action slips and lapses that occur dur-
ing skill-based, routine behavior usually all information to detect
the error is available such that almost all errors are consciously
perceived. For example, in speeded choice reaction time tasks,
such as the Eriksen Flanker task, where subjects have to respond
to a centrally presented target stimulus and ignore (conflict-
ing) stimuli next to the target, usually 90% or more errors are
detected by healthy participants (Ullsperger and Von Cramon,
2006; Seifert et al., 2011). In contrast, mistakes of planning or
judgment during rule-based or knowledge-based behavior are
less easy to detect (Reason, 1990). Particularly, if errors result
from failures of interpretation and comprehension of the cur-
rent task situation, they are often performed with high confidence
and are therefore often missed. In underdetermined, overwhelm-
ingly complex situations, participants have a low confidence in
their responses, but without feedback they are unable to deter-
mine whether their response was correct or erroneous. Errors can
also result from insufficient perceptual information, for instance,
when stimuli are degraded or masked. In this case, the neces-
sary sensory information for performance monitoring processes
is missing, so that errors cannot be noticed. If errors result from
general decreases of arousal and a disengagement from the task
(Eichele et al., 2008), their likelihood to be consciously perceived
can be expected to decrease. This may be particularly true for
errors that occur after sleep deprivation (Scheffers et al., 1999;
Chee et al., 2008), but this hypothesis still needs to be tested.
Indeed Shalgi et al. (2007) were able to show that greater task
monotony (presumably via reduced arousal) reduces the number
of errors that are consciously perceived. Finally errors can result
from failures in the processing of the perceptual properties of the
stimulus (see also section “Experimental Paradigms to Investigate
Error Awareness”).
Usually, error awareness has been studied by asking partici-
pants whether they noticed having made a mistake, since it has
been unclear whether error awareness can be quantified reliably
in a more direct and objective way, i.e., without asking partici-
pants after every trial. However, recent studies suggest that the
amplitude of the error positivity (Pe) might be a good quantita-
tive correlate of error awareness (Murphy et al., 2012; see below),
particularly when quantified in single trials and/or time-locked
to the error-signaling response (see below), since the Pe seems to
be linked to the time when the subject presses the error-signaling
button.
Often, participants are asked to signal any encountered error
by pressing an “error signaling button” (Rabbitt, 1968). This
procedure may, however, induce some response bias, because
for responses considered correct no motor response is needed.
Furthermore, short inter-trial intervals may prevent participants
from signaling errors despite being aware of them. A number
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of studies therefore explicitly asked participants after each trial,
whether they deemed the preceding behavior correct or incorrect
(Endrass et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2007a; Logan and Crump, 2010;
Wessel et al., 2011).
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGMS TO INVESTIGATE ERROR
AWARENESS
Three kinds of tasks have been used to study error awareness. As
discussed in Ullsperger et al. (2010), they appear to interfere with
the accumulation of error evidence at different stages, thereby
resulting in a sufficient number of errors that remain uncon-
scious. (1) When the detection of stimuli is rendered increasingly
difficult, for example by degrading visibility (Scheffers and Coles,
2000) or metacontrast masking (Maier et al., 2008; Cohen et al.,
2009; Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010), participants not only make
more errors, they are also less certain about their performance
and miss a number of mistakes. (2) Oculomotor tasks, such
as the antisaccade task, have been very successful in inducing
unperceived errors (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al.,
2007; Klein et al., 2007a; Wessel et al., 2011). It appears that
error evidence from proprioception and sensory (visual) input
is rather weak for short and immediately corrected prosaccades,
such that they are easily overlooked (Ullsperger et al., 2010).
(3) In complex task sets consisting of a number of competing
and constantly to-be-monitored rules, some rule representation
may be dominant and others only weakly represented. Errors
related to one rule may then remain undetected more frequently.
This principle has been successfully applied in a number of
studies using a Go/NoGo task with two different NoGo condi-
tions (Hester et al., 2005; O’Connell et al., 2007). The typical
error awareness task in these studies consisted of color words
printed in congruent or incongruent ink (as in a Stroop task).
The majority of stimuli were congruent words, serving as sig-
nal for a Go response. In contrast, when incongruent stimuli
appeared (rule 1) or a color word was repeated in two suc-
cessive trials (rule 2), subjects had to withhold their response
(NoGo). Continuously monitoring both congruency and repeti-
tions appears to be difficult and leads to many NoGo errors that
subjects are not aware of.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF ERROR
AWARENESS
Performance monitoring is associated with a number of neural
correlates that appear to be differentially modulated by con-
scious error perception. Based on early findings in antisaccade
tasks (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Klein et al., 2007a) and the
Go/NoGo “error awareness task” (O’Connell et al., 2007) it was
assumed for a long time that the error-related negativity (ERN)
(Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1993), a frontocentral
event-related potential occurring shortly after erroneous but-
ton presses in speeded choice reaction time tasks, was present
on all error trials and unaffected by conscious error percep-
tion. In contrast, the later and more posterior Pe (Falkenstein
et al., 1990) was present only when errors were perceived con-
sciously (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2007). Similarly,
neuroimaging studies seemed to suggest that the pMFC, the puta-
tive generator of the ERN, was active on both reported and
unreported errors, whereas the anterior insula was specifically
modulated by error awareness (Ullsperger et al., 2010).
However, a recent study using an antisaccade task (Wessel
et al., 2011) as well as studies using degraded or masked stimuli
(Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010) showed
that the ERN may co-vary with error awareness as well. Smaller
ERN amplitudes are associated with a lower likelihood to con-
sciously perceive the error. Shalgi and Deouell (2012) were able
to show that the amplitude of the ERN is related to error aware-
ness and that it co-varies with the individual confidence with
which an answer was made (higher amplitude in aware errors for
confident subjects). In line with this, more recent fMRI studies
reported greater pMFC activity in aware compared to unaware
errors (Hester et al., 2009, 2012; Orr and Hester, 2012; see also
“Posterior Medial Frontal Cortex”). Current views suggest that
the ERN (and feedback-related negativity, FRN) reflects the pro-
cessing of single pieces of objective evidence for an error (or
other events requiring adaptation). For example, when stimulus-
induced evidence is low, the ERN amplitude is low (Scheffers and
Coles, 2000). In a flanker task study with response feedback, in
most trials feedback is redundant and not associated with an addi-
tional negativity (De Bruijn et al., 2004; Gentsch et al., 2009).
When, for any reason on some trials efference copy or percep-
tual information available at the time of the response was reduced
(behaviorally reflected in prolonged remedial action times), not
only the ERNwas reduced in amplitude but also an FRN appeared
in the same trial (Gentsch et al., 2009). Thus, the additional feed-
back information was used to disambiguate the situation. In such
trials, two small pieces of evidence for an error occurred in short
succession and were both reflected in medial frontal negativities,
namely the (reduced) ERN and (increased) FRN. This is com-
patible with the view that error evidence accumulates with new
incoming information related to action outcome. When suffi-
cient evidence has accumulated, this may be the basis of error
awareness. In contrast to the ERN, the Pe reflects the subjective
(accumulated) evidence associated with conscious awareness (cf.
Wessel, 2012). A recent study suggests that the Pe amplitude and
latency correlates with the subject’s indication of error awareness
and predicts reliably whether an error would be consciously per-
ceived or not (Murphy et al., 2012). Thus, the Pe appears to be a
good measure of error awareness. Murphy et al. (2012), however,
suggest investigating the Pe locked to the error-signaling response
and not time-locked to the response. This should make clear that
a reduced amplitude is really due to diminished awareness and
not to for example a higher variability in the latency of error
awareness.
FUNCTIONS OF THE INSULAR CORTEX
Several reviews about the functional neuroanatomy of the insula
have been published recently (Kurth et al., 2010; Menon and
Uddin, 2010; Cauda et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 2012). Therefore,
we only want to give a brief overview over functions that have
been associated with this brain area (see Figure 1). In line with the
cytoarchitechtonic gradient in the insula (Mesulam and Mufson,
1982a; see below)—from agranular cortex in the (inferior) ante-
rior part to dysgranular cortex in the middle part to granular
cortex in the posterior part—Cauda et al. (2011) reported two
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FIGURE 1 | Cytoarchitectonic, structural connectivity, and functional
maps of the human insula. (A) Cytoarchitectonic gradient from agranular
cortex in the anterior inferior insula via dysgranular cortex to granular
cortex in the posterior part of the insula. (B) Structural connectivity
gradient in the insula according to Cerliani et al. (2012). Unlike in other
brain areas (e.g., premotor cortex), they did not find any clear border
between insula regions based on the structural connectivity profile;
instead, they reported a gradual change in connectivity patterns from
anterior to posterior insular areas. (C) Cytoarchitectonic map adapted from
Von Economo and Koskinas (1925). They did not find any agranular areas
within the insula (except from a fronto-insular region anterior to what is
shown here), but a less granulated area “Insula A1” and stronger
granulated areas more posterior. Note, that they explicitly report a
transition area “Insula AB” between anterior and posterior insular regions.
(D) Functional areas of the insula according to Deen et al. (2011).
(E) Functional differentiation of the insula according to Cauda et al. (2011).
Note, that they report a transition area between the anterior and the
posterior part. (F) Functional areas in the insula according to Kurth et al.
(2010). They reported four different areas, also with a clear overlap in the
middle aspects of the insula.
overlapping functional networks, an attention-related network
anterior, and a sensorimotor network posterior, with a large
overlap of both networks inmid-insula areas. Bymeans of ameta-
analysis of functional neuroimaging data, Kurth et al. (2010)
found four distinct functional regions within the insula. They
described the inferior anterior part of the insula in terms of
social-emotional processes, the superior anterior part in relation
to cognitive processes, a chemical sensory area in the middle part
and a sensorimotor area in the posterior part, with considerable
overlap between functional areas especially in the middle part of
the insula. Based on resting state data, Kelly et al. (2012) reported
up to nine different functional clusters within the insula, also with
considerable overlap between these clusters. In agreement with
other studies, they found cognitive and attentional processes to
be located in more anterior parts, emotional aspects in inferior
parts, and sensorimotor and interoceptive processes in posterior
parts. Additionally, Mutschler et al. (2009) reported consistent
activation of the inferior anterior insula in relation to peripheral
physiological changes. As reviewed already by Augustine (1996),
the insula is engaged in a wide variety of functions, such as
visceral sensory and motor processes, vestibular processes, lim-
bic integration, motor association, and language-related auditory
processing. In the last decade, the role of the insula in intero-
ception has been emphasized, as well as its role in emotional
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and interoceptive awareness or awareness in general (Critchley
et al., 2004; Craig, 2011; Simmons et al., 2012). Recently, it has
been suggested that the right fronto-insular cortex plays a crucial
role in switching activity between different functional networks,
especially the default mode and an executive network (Sridharan
et al., 2008), or that the anterior insula is involved in detecting
novel salient stimuli in different modalities (Menon and Uddin,
2010). This last hypothesis is in agreement with the suggestion
that the anterior insular cortex (AIC) is part of a salience net-
work, consisting of the AIC, the anterior cingulate cortex, the
amygdala, and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (Seth et al., 2011).
The notion that the AIC belongs to a salience network fits well
with observations that the AIC plays a crucial role in error aware-
ness (e.g., Klein et al., 2007a; see below), because consciously
perceived errors are obviously salient events, whereas unnoticed
errors are not. Furthermore, there are strong intra-insular con-
nections (Augustine, 1996; Kurth et al., 2010), suggesting that
posterior parts might feed information into the salience network
located in AIC. An interruption of this process due to lesions
within the insula might result in a mismatch in bodily or sensori-
motor perceptions. Especially the awareness for limb functioning
and the sense for limb ownership seem to require intact insular
functions. As pointed out by Karnath et al. (Karnath et al., 2005;
Baier and Karnath, 2008; Karnath and Baier, 2010), especially
the right posterior insular was repeatedly found in lesion analysis
studies with stroke patients to be a central element in the pro-
cess of interoceptive awareness necessary for intact sense of limb
functioning and limb ownership. Berti et al. (2005) also report
that, besides lesions in motor and premotor areas, lesions to pre-
frontal areas like BA 46 and the insula are differentially involved
in AHP as well (but less frequent). More recently, however, Vocat
et al. (2010) reported lesions to the anterior insula as being crucial
for AHP especially during the hyperacute (three days post insult)
phase.
NEUROANATOMICAL BASIS OF ERROR AWARENESS
A few brain areas have been associated with conscious error per-
ception. Most studies suggest that the anterior insula is crucial
for error awareness. Besides the insula, the pMFC (comprising
the pre-supplementary motor area and an area that is equivalent
to the ACC in monkeys, i.e., the anterior mid-cingulate cortex,
aMCC; cf. Vogt, 2005), and the thalamus might be important
for error awareness. In the majority of studies reporting insula
activations, the aMCC is co-activated with the insula (cf. Craig,
2009). In the following, insula anatomy and connectivity will be
described briefly. Then, we will report studies providing evidence
that the anterior insula, the thalamus, and the pMFC are crucial
for conscious error perception.
INSULA: STRUCTURE AND CONNECTIVITY
The anterior inferior part of the human insula consists of agran-
ular cortex. Specific cytoarchitectonic areas of the insula are
preferentially connected to cytoarchitectonically similar areas in
other parts of the brain (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982b; Mufson
and Mesulam, 1982), that is, agranular areas are predominantly
connected to other agranular cortical areas, e.g., the anterior
cingulate cortex. Cytoarchitectonically, there is a gradient from
agranular cortex, located in the anterior insula, to dysgranular
cortex located in the middle part of the insula and to granu-
lar cortex in the posterior insula (see Figure 1). However, Von
Economo and Koskinas (1925) doubted that there are agranular
areas in the insula (except of a fronto-insular transition area at the
anterior border of the insula), but their data also suggest the pres-
ence of a cytoarchitectonic gradient from dysgranular cortex in
the superior anterior insula to granular cortex in posterior insula
regions.
The von Economo neurons (VENs) have been found in both
the anterior cingulate cortex and the frontal insular cortex in
humans and great apes (Von Economo, 1926; Allman et al.,
2010; Seeley et al., 2012), and recently also in macaque monkeys
(Evrard et al., 2012). They appear to be projection neurons and
most likely project to the frontal pole, other frontal, and insu-
lar areas, the septum, and the amygdala (Allman et al., 2010).
Allman et al. (2010) found that the protein, which is encoded
by the DISC1 gene (disrupted in schizophrenia), is preferentially
expressed in VENs, thereby relating these neurons to a genetic
basis of schizophrenia.
In macaque monkeys the insular cortex is characterized by
widespread anatomical connections (for an overview see Cerliani
et al., 2012), among them projections to autonomic nuclei in the
brainstem and several thalamic nuclei. Cerliani et al. (2012) inves-
tigated white matter connections of the insula cortex in humans
by using diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI). This type of con-
nectivity data can be used to parcellate brain regions according
to their connectivity profile. Usually, at the border between two
functionally different regions, a clear change in the connectivity
profile can be observed. However, Cerliani et al. (2012) reported
that this connectivity-based parcellation did not yield reliable,
clearly distinguishable subregions for the insula, since they did
not find any of these abrupt changes in the connectivity profile of
the insula. The authors instead argue that their connectivity data
suggest a gradient in connectivity profiles from the anterior to
posterior insula, which show a large overlap in their connectivity
profile without any distinct borders. According to their results, the
anterior (agranular) part of the insula is mainly connected to the
orbitofrontal cortex, the amygdala, and the rostral part of the IFG,
whereas the posterior (granular) part of the insula is connected
to parietal and posterior temporal areas, caudal parts of the IFG,
and the lateral premotor cortex. The dysgranular insular cortex
in between shows some overlap in the connectivity pattern with
both the anterior and posterior insula. While the anterior dys-
granular areas are more similar to the connectivity pattern of the
agranular insula, the posterior dysgranular areas are more sim-
ilar to the connectivity pattern of the granular insula. Thus, in
line with the cytoarchitectonic gradient from agranular to granu-
lar cortex, there also is a connectivity gradient from anterior to
posterior in the insula without any distinct borders that could
potentially have been defined based on abrupt changes in con-
nectivity (Cerliani et al., 2012). However, one limitation of this
study is that only brain areas, that are part of the probabilistic
cytoarchitectonic map from Juelich (cf. Cerliani et al., 2012 for a
complete overview of used maps), have been included as poten-
tial target areas. Therefore, some brain areas, such as the aMCC,
that are connected to the insula in rhesus monkeys (Morecraft
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et al., 2012), but which are not yet included in these maps, could
not be found as projection targets of the insula. The large diver-
sity of insula connections makes this brain area well suited for
the integration of external signals with interoception (Seth et al.,
2011).
Cauda et al. (2011) used resting state fMRI measures to iden-
tify functional networks of the insula. They found an anterior
and a posterior network in the insula and a transition area in
between, thus, corroborating the insular gradient in the cytoar-
chitectonic data and the DWI study by Cerliani et al. (2012). The
anterior insula was functionally connected to the rostral ACC,
middle and inferior lateral frontal cortex and temporoparietal
areas. The posterior insula was part of a network consisting of
the superior posterior cingulate cortex, motor areas (including
pre-SMA and premotor cortex), somatosensory areas, temporal
cortex, and parts of the occipital lobe. The authors described the
anterior insular network as “attention network” and the posterior
insular network as “sensorimotor network.”
Deen et al. (2011) divided the insula in 3 subregions based
on functional connectivity measures: an anterior inferior part,
an anterior superior part, and a posterior part. The inferior part
of the anterior insula was most strongly connected to the pre-
genual ACC, while the superior part of the anterior insula was
mainly connected to the aMCC. The posterior insula was func-
tionally connected to posterior MCC. The results by Deen et al.
(2011) suggest that areas of the insula are systematically con-
nected to the medial frontal cortex (MFC) with more anterior
insular regions being connected to more anterior MFC regions
and more posterior insular regions to more posterior MFC areas.
Besides the functional connections between insula and MFC,
extensive connectivity with other brain areas were reported (Deen
et al., 2011): the inferior anterior insula was connected to oper-
cular cortex, the posterior IFG, and the superior temporal sul-
cus. The superior anterior insula showed functional connections
with visual areas, the medial thalamus, opercular and posterior
orbitofrontal cortex, pre-supplementary motor cortex, precentral
sulcus, supramarginal gyrus, and the anterior IFG. The pos-
terior insula was connected with motor (including SMA) and
somatosensory areas, opercular cortex, pre-SMA, and the medial
thalamus. All insular subregions were interconnected, providing
a structural basis for the communication between different parts
of the insula, i.e., between somatosensory and attention-related
areas.
Co-activations of brain regions, and thus potential functional
networks, can also be demonstrated in fMRI meta-analysis as well
as in spatial independent component analysis (ICA) of fMRI data.
Ameta-analysis of performance monitoring showed co-activation
of anterior insula, aMCC, and thalamic regions (Klein et al.,
2007a; Ullsperger et al., 2010). Similarly, the posterior MFC, tha-
lamus, and anterior insula were repeatedly covered by the same
independent components, suggesting a highly similar signal time
course in these regions (Dosenbach et al., 2007; Eichele et al.,
2008; Danielmeier et al., 2011).
In conclusion, the insular cortex is involved in at least
2–3 functional networks. Both macaque cytoarchitectonics and
human connectivity studies (Cauda et al., 2011; Deen et al.,
2011) suggest that there might be no distinct subdivisions in
the insula, but instead, that there is an anterior-to-posterior gra-
dient in both cytoarchitectonics and connectivity. Craig (2011)
suggested a functional gradient within the insula, with poste-
rior insula regions reflecting the objective stimulation strength
(e.g., of painful stimuli), and anterior regions reflecting subjec-
tive feelings related to this stimulus. This suggestion is in line with
interoceptive processes that have been associated with the insula.
THE INSULA AND AWARENESS DEFICITS
Especially the anterior inferior insula seems to be involved in
error awareness. In an antisaccade task, the anterior insula was the
only brain area distinguishing between consciously perceived and
unperceived errors (Klein et al., 2007a). In an fMRI study employ-
ing the error awareness Go/NoGo task described above, it has
been shown that consciously perceived errors go along with larger
BOLD responses in the right insula and in left inferior parietal
regions (Hester et al., 2009).
According to Kurth et al. (2010), the anterior insula is
functionally related to attentional and cognitive processes and
autonomic responses. A meta-analysis (Mutschler et al., 2009)
has associated the anterior inferior insula with autonomic
responses, such as changes in heart rate or skin conductance rate.
Furthermore, this part of the insula is often co-activated with
the amygdala. Intraoperative stimulations of the insula in epilep-
tic patients led to changes in cardiac responses (Oppenheimer
et al., 1992). Wessel et al. (2011) have recently described a link
between error awareness and cardiac responses. Following per-
ceived errors, a stronger heart beat deceleration was observed
compared to unperceived errors. Craig (2009) suggested that the
right AIC activity correlates with subjective feelings of body states,
e.g., pain or awareness of heartbeats. Similarly, Paulus et al. (2009)
suggested that the functional role of the insula is to detect dis-
crepancies between the predicted body state and the actual body
state. Recently, Seth et al. (2011) proposed a model of awareness
(or “presence”) in general, i.e., not restricted to error awareness.
They suggested that the insula is crucial for the integration of
interoceptive and exteroceptive signals, and the anterior insula
is assumed to be a “comparator or error module” (Seth et al.,
2011). This is likely to also apply to error awareness, as already
discussed in the Introduction. However, at this point it is unclear
whether the autonomic response is cause, result or correlate of
error awareness.
As mentioned above, the posterior region of the insula is con-
nected to the SMA and premotor areas (Cerliani et al., 2012).
Lesions in the right posterior insula can lead to AHP (Karnath
et al., 2005), which can be defined as selective disorder of aware-
ness for motor deficits (Spinazzola et al., 2008). This supports
the notion by Craig (2009) that the insular cortex in general is
related to awareness. While the anterior insula has been asso-
ciated with error awareness, the middle and posterior insular
cortex seem to be associated with the awareness of motor and
somatosensory processes (Karnath et al., 2005; Spinazzola et al.,
2008). Thus, depending on the exact lesion location within the
insula, one might observe different, domain-specific awareness
deficits. This gradient in awareness deficits from anterior to pos-
terior insular areas might reflect the underlying connectivity and
cytoarchitectonics gradient within the insula.
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THALAMUS AND AWARENESS DEFICITS
Some studies suggest that thalamic lesions can also impair
error awareness and lead to anosognosia (De Witte et al., 2011;
Peterburs et al., 2011; Seifert et al., 2011). In a review by De
Witte et al. (2011), two patients were described who suffered from
anosognosia after bilateral thalamic lesions. In a study by Seifert
et al. (2011), patients with chronic thalamic lesions were asked
to participate in a flanker task and signal their errors with a but-
ton press. While the age matched control group signaled 85% of
their errors on average, the patient group indicated only 39% of
their erroneous responses. This suggests that in patients, suffer-
ing from thalamic lesions, a majority of errors is not perceived
consciously. This result has been replicated in an antisaccade
task (Peterburs et al., 2011). Patients with thalamic lesions sig-
naled their errors significantly less often than the healthy control
group. Thus, there is preliminary evidence that error awareness
is reduced following thalamic lesions. However, in both stud-
ies an error signaling procedure was used. This procedure has
some disadvantages, e.g., patients who generally respond slower
than healthy individuals might prefer to avoid additional button
presses in between trials. Thus, they might notice their errors but
miss to indicate them (cf. Wessel, 2012). However, significantly
reduced Pe amplitudes in these patients provide additional evi-
dence for impaired error awareness (Seifert et al., 2011). A further,
previously unpublished analysis of the data by Seifert and col-
leagues broken down by lesioned thalamic subregions revealed
that the Pe is absent in patients with lesions focused on the
mediodorsal nucleus and only marginally reduced in ampli-
tude in patients with focal lesions in the ventral anterior and
ventrolateral anterior nuclei. Interestingly, the ERN showed the
opposite pattern of impairment. Thus, it appears that the basal-
ganglia-thalamocingulate circuit is involved in ERN generation,
whereas the more arousal-related circuitry of the mediodorsal
nucleus plays a role in error awareness and generation of the
Pe. Given the limited sample size, further studies with thalamic
patients are necessary that involve a procedure where partici-
pants are required to evaluate the accuracy of their response after
every trial (e.g., as described in Klein et al., 2007a; Wessel et al.,
2011).
POSTERIORMEDIAL FRONTAL CORTEX
There are mixed results with respect to the role of the pMFC
in error awareness. While earlier studies did not find any dif-
ference in pMFC activity between perceived and unperceived
errors (Hester et al., 2005; Klein et al., 2007a), recent studies
did find a difference in medial frontal areas (Hester et al., 2009,
2012; Orr and Hester, 2012). Furthermore, recent electrophysio-
logical studies on error awareness found larger ERN amplitudes
in consciously perceived errors compared to unperceived errors
(Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010; Wessel
et al., 2011; Shalgi and Deouell, 2012; for a review see Wessel,
2012). While error correction appears to be affected by lesions
of the pMFC (Swick and Turken, 2004; Modirrousta and Fellows,
2008), studies directly addressing error awareness in patients with
pMFC lesions are lacking.
In sum, most error awareness studies identify the ante-
rior inferior insula as crucial neuronal correlate of conscious
error perception, but there is also preliminary evidence that the
pMFC and thalamic regions are important structures for error
awareness.
DRUGS AFFECTING CONSCIOUS ERROR PERCEPTION
It has been shown that the use of certain drugs attenuates
the response of the aMCC to errors or diminishes the ERN.
This has been demonstrated for cocaine, opioids, and alcohol
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2002; Kaufman et al., 2003; Forman et al.,
2004). Furthermore, the dopaminergic D2 receptor antagonist
haloperidol reduces the ERN response to errors in flanker tasks
(Zirnheld et al., 2004; De Bruijn et al., 2006), and there is evi-
dence that smaller ERN amplitudes go along with reduced error
awareness (see above). Moreover, subjects with lower D2 receptor
density showed attenuated pMFC responses to negative feed-
back (Klein et al., 2007b). Therefore, the question arises whether
the use of certain drugs also affects error awareness and, more
specifically, whether dopamine (DA) plays a crucial role in con-
scious error detection. In the following, we will review those
studies that investigated error awareness under pharmacological
challenges.
Hester et al. (2007) showed that cocaine use can lead to
reduced error awareness. They investigated a group of active
cocaine users with the Go-NoGo error awareness task described
above. Cocaine is assumed to exert its influence by blocking
the re-uptake of DA, norepinephrine (NE) and serotonin and
thereby increasing extracellular DA levels in those brain areas
with afferents from the mesolimbic DA system (cf. Kuhar et al.,
1991; Jocham et al., 2007). Thus, a long-term effect of cocaine
use seems to be that the DA receptor density decreases (Volkow
et al., 1990). This could explain an attenuated aMCC response in
cocaine users (Kaufman et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2007b). However,
error awareness in cocaine users was not decreased in general,
but specific for certain error types. In the error awareness task
employed by Hester et al. (2007), errors were committed when
participants failed to withhold their response either to incon-
gruent stimuli (first NoGo condition) or to the repetition of
the same stimulus as in the trial before (repeat trials, second
NoGo condition). Interestingly, cocaine users showed reduced
error awareness only in repeat trial errors, but conscious error
perception in incongruent trials was comparable to that in the
control group. Therefore, one cannot unequivocally conclude
that cocaine use leads to reduced error awareness. An alterna-
tive explanation could be that cocaine use might cause slight
working memory or attentional impairments, and therefore, only
repeat trial errors were noticed less often. Moreover, Garavan
et al. (2008) showed that cocaine does affect insular activity.
After i.v. cocaine administration, participants showed enhanced
insular activity in response to performance errors. Note that an
acute cocaine administration might evoke different effects than
long-term cocaine usage.
In a later fMRI study using the same task, Hester et al. (2009)
showed that error awareness is reduced in chronic cannabis users.
In this study, reduced error awareness was associated with atten-
uated aMCC activity in cannabis users. There was also a relation
between insula activity and error awareness: insula activity was
negatively correlated with the amounts of cannabis used, and
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 14 | 7
Klein et al. The insula and awareness deficits
higher cannabis craving was correlated with less error aware-
ness. Insula activations are reliably found in craving paradigms
(Garavan, 2010). The craving for abused drugs seems to be linked
to hypocretin (orexin) transmission in the insula, which in turn
might modulate DA release in connected brain areas (Kenny,
2011). In mice, hypocretin has been associated with modulations
in wakefulness, and it has been suggested that the hypocretin neu-
ral network might initiate arousal responses (Adamantidis et al.,
2007), which would be a plausible adjustment after errors. It
has been suggested before that errors might elicit an orienting
response (Notebaert et al., 2009; Wessel et al., 2012), which is
associated with increased arousal. Thus, hypocretin effects in the
insula might be two-fold: on the one hand it could potentially
increase arousal, and on the other hand, it could influence DA
and NE release.
A recent study showed an enhancing effect of methylphenidate
(MPH) on error awareness (Hester et al., 2012). Healthy partic-
ipants perceived more errors consciously when they were under
the influence of MPH than in the placebo condition. MPH has
also proven to be effective in the treatment of cognitive deficits
that can be observed after traumatic brain injury (Willmott
and Ponsford, 2009), which have been associated with reduced
awareness (O’Keeffe et al., 2004). Since MPH is a DA and NE
reuptake inhibitor, it can be seen as indirect DA agonist (cf.
Hester et al., 2012). Thus, this study provides further evidence
that error awareness could be related to DA levels. Furthermore,
a study by Frank et al. (2007) showed an effect of the catechol-
o-methyltransferase (COMT) genotype on the Pe, which is sys-
tematically linked to error awareness. The val/met polymorphism
of the COMT gene has been associated with prefrontal DA levels
(Egan et al., 2001; Bilder et al., 2004).
Although the number of studies investigating neurochemical
aspects of conscious error perception is very limited, there is con-
verging evidence that the catecholamines DA and NE are highly
relevant neurotransmitters associated with error awareness. Most
direct evidence for a relation between these neurotransmitters
and error awareness has been collected with psychostimulants
that increase extracellular DA and NE. The role of hypocretin
needs further investigation, but it seems to modulate DA, NE,
and serotonin release as well. Given its proposed role in the
orienting reflex and the generation of the P300 (and Pe) poten-
tials (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005), NE is likely to be involved in
error awareness. Based on the current knowledge on the role of
DA and NE in performance monitoring and attention (Aston-
Jones and Cohen, 2005; Jocham and Ullsperger, 2009; Cools,
2011) one can assume that these neurotransmitters play a role
in strengthening the error signal and enhance subsequent cen-
tral neural and autonomic activity changes that contribute to
conscious error perception. Differentiating the contributions of
DA and NE to error awareness is an important goal for future
research.
INSULA INVOLVEMENT IN ANOSOGNOSIA FOR
HEMIPLEGIA: A LINK TO ERROR AWARENESS?
As already proposed by Vocat and Vuilleumier (2010), AHP
and error unawareness might share some neuroanatomical cor-
relates. Poor insight into the consequences of a neurological
disease is related to poor treatment outcome and reduced treat-
ment compliance. Sometimes anosognosia is also accompanied
by a disturbance of the sense of agency and the sense of limb
ownership (Karnath and Baier, 2010). In general, anosognosia
can be observed following both right and left hemispheric brain
damage with some predominance of appearance following right
hemispheric insult. In the acute phase of a neurological dis-
ease, anosognosia is observed quite often: In a meta-analysis of
27 studies a median of 26% of patients following right hemi-
spheric and a median of 10% of patients following left hemi-
spheric stroke showed signs of anosognosia (Jehkonen et al.,
2006).
The insular cortex has often been associated with deficit aware-
ness (Karnath et al., 2005; Prigatano, 2009; Craig, 2010). Other
relevant brain areas in AHP are the prefrontal cortex, the inferior
parietal lobe, the angular gyrus, the supramarginal gyrus, and the
anterior temporal lobe (Prigatano and Shacter, 1991). Especially
during the first days of acute illness, damage to the posterior insu-
lar is predictive for developing anosognosia. Vocat and colleagues
showed that in patients with sustained unawareness frontal and
parietal brain areas were also affected (Vocat et al., 2010).
There might be two subcomponents of error processing: an
early component that is not dependent on any kind of propri-
oceptive feedback but solely based on the efference copy of the
executed action, and a second component that is more about
the evaluation of the error and potential adjustments to avoid
future errors of a similar kind (see Vocat and Vuilleumier, 2010
for a similar account of deficit awareness). Similarly, Prigatano
(2010) claims that self-awareness is necessary for performance
monitoring. This self-referential information (provided by inte-
roceptive awareness, Craig, 2010) has to be integrated with
external information (supplied by exteroceptive awareness, Craig,
2010) in order to come up with an accurate view of the situ-
ation or the action and its outcome, respectively. It has been
suggested that this integration takes place in the insular cortex
(Craig, 2011). When the representation of internal or exter-
nal information is corrupted (what might be the case follow-
ing brain lesions), deficient decisions or profound problems in
awareness of the outcome of a decision/action might be the
consequence.
Although several brain areas have been discussed to play a role
in AHP (for reviews on AHP in general see e.g., Vuilleumier, 2004;
Vocat and Vuilleumier, 2010), the insular cortex seems to play a
prominent role in deficit awareness. The complex connectivity
patterns of anterior and posterior insular cortex might suggest
that awareness in general is the product of a network of brain
regions all providing different kinds of information which finally
allow awareness for internal and external information (e.g., Vocat
and Vuilleumier, 2010). However, studies directly linking symp-
toms of AHP to electrophysiological (Pe) or functional (fMRI)
correlates of error awareness are missing so far.
PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS, THE INSULAR CORTEX, AND ERROR
AWARENESS
Psychiatric patients sometimes show a high degree of lack of
insight into their psychiatric condition. Because lack of insight
might be related to deficient monitoring processes and reduced
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self-awareness, we review several studies that investigated error
monitoring (mostly electrophysiological correlates of error mon-
itoring or error awareness) in psychiatric patients. Lack of insight
is, for example, a frequent observation in patients suffering from
schizophrenia. Other psychiatric diseases like attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism spectrum disorders
(ASD) might also lead to patients’ insensitivity to negative action
outcomes, thereby promoting reduced error awareness. Since the
insular cortex seems to play a crucial role in error awareness and
AHP, an explicit focus will be put on the potential role of this area
in disease symptomatology. This does, of course, not imply that
a potential insular pathology alone accounts for the psychiatric
disease under discussion.
CLINICAL SYMPTOMS
Misattribution of thoughts and events to external sources as a
consequence of altered monitoring processes is one key symp-
tom of schizophrenia (Frith, 1987; Ullsperger, 2006). At least 50%
of schizophrenic patients are without awareness for their dis-
order (Pia and Tamietto, 2006). The question, whether or not
error awareness is compromised in schizophrenia was directly
addressed byMathalon et al. (2002) using a task in which no error
signaling response was required. They compared patients suffer-
ing from schizophrenia with healthy controls while both groups
worked on a performance-monitoring task with concurrent EEG
recordings. Compared to healthy controls, schizophrenic subjects
(especially those with paranoid schizophrenia) showed smaller
ERN and larger CRN (correct-related negativity) amplitudes, but
no differences in the Pe amplitude and subsequent post-error
slowing (PES) (Mathalon et al., 2002). The authors concluded
that perception of an error is sufficient but not necessary for
producing the ERN, but that it is necessary for producing the
Pe. Deficits in self-monitoring as indexed by altered perfor-
mance monitoring might underlie some of the positive symptoms
observed in schizophrenia as Mathalon et al. (2002) suggest.
Corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia (Ford et al.,
2001) could explain not only the sensory integration deficits but
also misattributions of action outcomes and agency and therefore
result in error awareness deficits.
Although schizophrenia affects various brain areas, we focus
here on studies reporting changes in the insula. Cytoarchitectonic
alterations in the inferior insular and enthorinal cortex were
found by Jakob and Beckmann (1986) in a subsample of post-
mortem brains of schizophrenia patients. Glahn et al. (2008)
extended these findings with a meta-analysis by showing that
gray matter of schizophrenic patients is reduced in a number
of brain areas one of which being the bilateral insular cortex.
Volume reduction of the left insular cortex in schizophrenia has
been shown several times (Crespo-Facorro et al., 2000; Kasai et al.,
2003; Kim et al., 2003). Using surface based morphometry in 57
schizophrenic patients Palaniyappan et al. (2011) demonstrated
an inverse relationship between right posterior insula structure
and the degree of insight in schizophrenia. The authors concluded
that the right posterior insula might be the basis for insight as
it allows for interoceptive awareness and self-appraisal of emo-
tional states within a functional network that comprises also
distant brain areas. In an extensive review of the existing literature
Wylie and Tregellas (2010) summarized the role of the insular
cortex in schizophrenia symptomatology. They concluded that
damage to the insula or damage to a greater network compris-
ing insular cortex could underlie many of the sensory-integration
deficits observed in schizophrenia (Wylie and Tregellas, 2010).
In a recent paper Williamson and Allman (2012) review the
role of different functional brain networks in schizophrenia.
Incorporating studies using voxel-based morphometry (VBM),
DWI, and resting state functional MRI they report different brain
networks as potentially relevant for schizophrenia. Besides (mal-)
functioning of a network related to directed effort (comprising
superior anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, auditory cor-
tex, and the hippocampus) also its (disturbed) interactions with
a brain network related to representations of thoughts, feelings,
and actions (with the frontal and temporal pole and the fron-
toinsular cortex) might be involved in the pathophysiology of
schizophrenia.
ADHD is associated with abnormalities in response to per-
formance errors (O’Connell et al., 2009). PES, which might be
indirectly linked to error awareness, was found to be reduced in a
large sample of ADHD children (Schachar et al., 2004).
O’Connell et al. (2009) investigated electrophysiological corre-
lates of performance monitoring in adult ADHD subjects. While
making more errors, the ADHD patients showed an attenuated
early and late Pe following erroneous responses. Furthermore,
these subjects showed reduced electrodermal reactivity to an
error, thus suggesting that errors had less emotional relevance
to them. Wiersema et al. (2009) corroborated the findings by
O’Connell et al. in ADHD subjects by showing reduced Pe ampli-
tudes which were correlated with ADHD symptoms, normal sized
ERN and no differences in behavioral adaptation following an
error. They concluded that early automatic error detection pro-
cesses are not affected in ADHD, but that there are illness related
differences in later evaluative processes.
Several other studies investigated error processing in children
with ADHD. It has been shown that ADHD children commit-
ted twice as many errors as healthy controls and did not show
post-error behavioral adaptations, like PES (Schachar et al., 2004;
Wiersema et al., 2005). As in ADHD adults, ADHD children also
showed reduced Pe amplitudes as compared to healthy controls
(Wiersema et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2009).
Patients suffering from ASD sometimes show perseverative
behavior, which might be interpreted as a consequence of
impaired performance monitoring. These patients might be less
sensitive to the course or the outcome of their actions thereby
having an increased risk to repeat behavior over and over again.
A role for the insular cortex might be assumed in this disorder:
Ebisch et al. (2011) showed in a group of 12–20-year-old ado-
lescents with high-functioning ASD in resting state fMRI that
functional connectivity between right anterior and bilateral pos-
terior insula with different other brain regions (posterior: inferior
and superior somatosensory cortices; anterior: amygdala) was
diminished as compared to results from a control group. Di
Martino et al. (2009) were able to show an increased likelihood
for hypoactivation of right anterior insula in studies analyz-
ing brain activity in social tasks with patients suffering from
ASD. Santos et al. (2011) investigated the frontoinsular cortex
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(layer V) of children suffering from autism using a stereologic
approach. They found a significantly higher ratio of VENs to
pyramidal neurons in the frontoinsular cortex of autistic chil-
dren (for a discussion of VEN in insular cortex see “Insula:
Structure and Connectivity”). Furthermore, they found a trend
for an increase of the total number of VENs in frontoinsular
cortex in autistic patients compared to their respective con-
trols. The authors interpret these findings in terms of a potential
neuronal overpopulation which might finally lead to increased
interoception sometimes being described as part of the autistic
syndrome.
Sokhadze et al. (2010) confronted autistic children with a
task suitable for investigating error processing (no error-signaling
response required). They demonstrated that these children com-
mitted significantly more errors, showed a smaller ERN with
a larger latency, a trend toward a reduction in Pe amplitude
compared to controls and no signs of PES; they rather showed
post-error-speeding. The authors discuss that these alterations in
performance monitoring might lead to reduced error awareness
thereby allowing no successful adaptation of behavior following
an error. Furthermore, Vlamings et al. (2008) were able to show
that children diagnosed with ASD showed a smaller ERN and Pe
and reduced PES.
DISCUSSION: ERROR AWARENESS AND PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS
Direct studies of error awareness in psychiatric patients are
rare. There is indirect evidence for altered error awareness in
schizophrenia, ADHD, and autism based on ERN and Pe ampli-
tudes. In schizophrenia patients, the ERN seems to be diminished,
but the Pe seems to be unaffected. Given that reduced ERN
amplitudes have been associated with impaired error awareness
(Wessel, 2012), but perhaps only when accompanied by reduced
Pe amplitudes, it remains unclear whether error awareness is
attenuated in schizophrenia. In contrast, in ADHD the Pe is
reduced, whereas the ERN seems to be unaffected. Based on the
results by Murphy et al. (2012), showing that Pe latency and
amplitude predicts error awareness, this suggests that error aware-
ness is compromised in ADHD. In ASD both the ERN and Pe are
diminished, suggesting that error awareness is reduced in this dis-
ease. However, the conclusions on error awareness in psychiatric
disorders are based on a very small number of studies, and further
studies investigating error awareness directly with proper error
awareness tasks are needed. Since the insular cortex has often been
associated with error awareness, we reported evidence for changes
in cytoarchitectonics, cortical volume, and functional connectiv-
ity in the insula of schizophrenia or ASD patients. Furthermore,
a recent review by Menon and Uddin (2010) suggested a promi-
nent role for the anterior insula acting together with the aMCC as
a key player within a so-called salience network which identifies
behaviorally relevant internal and external stimuli. The anterior
insula is thereby not only thought to detect salient stimuli but
also to initiate switches between other major brain networks (i.e.,
default mode network and central-executive network), modulate
autonomic activity (via interplay with the posterior insula) and
finally having direct access to the motor system via the aMCC.
The authors conclude that alterations in the integrity of this
salience network might underlie the symptomatology of different
psychiatric disorders. Taken together it is not only the structural
and functional integrity of the insular cortex per se that seems
necessary for mental health but also intact structural and func-
tional connectivity between insular cortex and other brain areas
is needed for intact cognitive functioning. Whether structural or
functional changes of insular cortex are also directly responsible
for the alterations in electrophysiological indices of error aware-
ness observed in patients suffering from either disease remains,
however, speculative.
CONCLUSIONS
Deficits in performance monitoring in general, and error aware-
ness in particular, might result from different pathological
changes in the brain. The anterior insula has been discussed
as part of an attentional network, and activity in this part of
the insula is related to error awareness, whereas more pos-
terior insula areas represent sensorimotor processes. AHP has
been described as deficit in the re-representation of sensori-
motor processes or as disorder of awareness for motor deficits
and can be observed after posterior insular lesions. The ante-
rior and posterior parts of the insula are highly interconnected.
Thus, the insular cortex could be a structural link between error
awareness and awareness of deficits or changes due to neu-
rological or psychiatric diseases. Craig (2011) suggested that
the integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive information
takes place in the insula. Similarly, Kurth et al. (2010, p. 519)
described the integration of “[. . .]different qualities into a coher-
ent experience of the world[. . .]” as one potential role of the
insula. This integration might be disturbed in anosognosia and
insight deficits. Although evidence is rather indirect yet, error
awareness seems to be attenuated in schizophrenia, ADHD, and
autism. Further studies are needed with respect to the underlying
somatosensory
emotion,
autonomic interoception,
part of salience network
cognitive control
decision making
po
st
er
io
r anterior
inferior
superior
AHP
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of insular cortex involvement in error
awareness, anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP), disturbed sense of
ownership (DSO) and disturbed sense of agency (DSA) overlaid on
schematic drawing of functional areas within the insula according to
Deen et al. (2011). Localization of AHP, DSO, and DSA based on Karnath
et al. (2005); Baier and Karnath (2008); Karnath and Baier (2010).
Localization of error awareness based on Klein et al. (2007a); Hester et al.
(2009, 2012); Orr and Hester (2012).
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neurotransmitter systems involved in error awareness, but pre-
liminary evidence indicates a prominent role of the dopaminergic
system.
In sum, the insula appears to receive and process informa-
tion on surprising and unwanted states. The anterior insula
is involved in (potential) problems with action performance,
such as errors, unexpected outcomes (Wessel et al., 2012),
or increased necessity of effort (Croxson et al., 2009; Prevost
et al., 2010). The posterior insula seems more involved in inte-
grating somatosensory input (see Figure 2). Hemiplegia results
in unusual and erroneous somatosensory and proprioceptive
feedback. An integrating feature of insular activity is that, if evi-
dence for salient action course or salient body perception is high,
it becomes active, is involved in the orienting response, and con-
sequently in awareness. The finding that in AHP posterior insular
cortex is affected supports this view—the salience of missing or
distorted feedback from the hemiplegic limbs is not detected and
processed appropriately. It remains to be tested, however, whether
anterior insular lesions impair error awareness.
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